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Abstract
This paper examines the incentives for local governments to improve their own fiscal bal-
ances in an environment of inter-regional resident migration, and shows that whether a local
government chooses to make its fiscal balances efficient depends on the condition of popula-
tion distribution. Since residents migrate between regions in the pursuit of higher utility, their
utility will become equal at a migration equilibrium. We obtain the following results from this
property of resident migration: a local government in a country with two regions will improve
its own fiscal balance efficiently when the utility of residents in the other region increases
with emigration from there. If the residents’ utility in the other region decreases, the local gov-
ernment will have an incentive to deteriorate its own fiscal balance. However, residents’ utility
will not decrease under this deterioration.
Key words: Resident migration; Reducing public expenditures; Local governments
JEL classification numbers: H72, H11
1 Introduction
Do local governments always have incentives to improve their budgets on local public
goods? The efficiency of local governments is as important as that of other sectors. 1 This is
particularly important considering that the fiscal balance of Japanese local governments has
deteriorated since the latter half of the 1990s. The central government has promoted decentral-
ization to the local governments in order to ameliorate the balance of public finance. In con-
crete terms, it has transferred tax sources to local governments and reduced subsidies. The
purpose is to make all sections of the public sector more efficient by transferring the authority
related to resources from the central government to local governments, which have more
information concerning their own regions.
Incidentally, it has been traditionally argued that if residents migrate freely under a
decentralized public finance system, local governments have incentives to be efficient
(Tiebout (1956)). However, many researches have clearly shown that resident migration does
not always bring efficiency. 2 Even if it is assumed that local governments are benevolent and
that there are no rent seeking activities by politicians and bureaucrats, resident migration does
not guarantee Pareto efficient allocation. These studies have looked at the efficiency of the
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1 See Oates (1999) and Inman & Rubinfeld (1997). These papers survey researches on local governments.
2 Refer to Itaba (2002), which surveys these researches in detail.
population distribution and of the provision of local public goods, but there are no studies
looking at improving the public balances under resident migration. 3 Since resident migration
does not always bring efficiency in allocation, some factors may exist that give local govern-
ments incentives to deteriorate their fiscal conditions under resident migration. The purpose
of this paper is to elucidate the conditions under which local governments have incentives for
improving their own public balances under resident migration. By showing these conditions, it
will be possible to encourage the central government to arrange conditions that local govern-
ments will make efficient efforts to improve the public balance. This analysis is intended to
contribute to the efficiency of Japanese local governments.
With regard to local public goods, in particular, if there are no externalities and local gov-
ernments do not take account of resident migration, then they will provide local public good
efficiently (Boadway & Flatters (1982)). However, the population distribution is not always
Pareto efficient in this case. Even when local governments take account of migration, local
public goods may not also be provided efficiently since local governments cannot directly
control resident migration in a way that makes the population distribution efficient. In this
case, local governments may distort the provision of local public goods in order to improve
the distribution of the population. If so, the device of inter-regional transfers resolves this
problem. Even if a local public good has externalities, this device makes the provision of local
public goods Pareto efficient. Myers (1990), Wellisch (1994) and Caplan, Cornes & Silva
(2000) show the effects of inter-regional transfers in cases where a local public good has no
externalities and where it has externalities. 4 On the other hand, Mitsui & Sato (2001) shows
that inter-regional transfers distributed by the central government without commitment bring
about a concentration of residents into one region. As a result, the population distribution
becomes inefficient. Thus, interregional transfers do not always bring about Pareto efficiency.
However, these researches lack the perspective of examining the efficiency of local govern-
ments. More precisely, they do not analyze whether each local government has an incentive to
improve its own public expenditures under resident migration. The improvement of public
expenditures means that local governments reduce the cost of local public goods and increase
the revenues of public services such as water, gas and traffic services by increasing productivity. 5
By improving their own public budget balances, local governments can attract immigra-
tion from other regions. The reason for this immigration is that the improvement of the public
budget balance brings larger utility to residents in the improved region than those in other
regions by allowing them to avoid increasing taxes and through reducing taxes. Since residents
migrate to the region that provides the largest utility, considering continuous residents, all res-
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3 There are studies on the incentive for policy innovation in local governments. Rose-Ackerman (1980) and Strumpf
(2002) show that under fiscal federalism, local governments become risk-averse and become free-riders that imitate new
technologies which other governments develop. These studies are similar to this paper since local governments need new
skills or know-how in order to reduce public expenditures without decreasing the level of public services. However, neither
study looks at the environment of resident migration, but rather at the uncertainty of policy innovation.
4 Myers analyzes the effect of inter-regional transfers managed by each local government in the case of local public
goods without externalities. The result is that this transfer makes the population distribution Pareto efficient, so that there is
no need for the central government. Wellisch analyzes the case of local public goods with externalities. In this case, the
population distribution lead to Pareto efficiency, too. Caplan et al. analyze the effect of different timings, meaning that each
local government is a leader and the central government a follower. In this case, the distribution becomes Pareto efficient.
These studies show that inter-regional transfers are needed in order to achieve efficiency.
5 These services often are in deficit. For example, many water services in Japan which are managed by local govern-
ments are in deficit. The average of the price in each region is 174 yen/m3. On the other hand, the average cost is 178
yen/m3 (data for 2004 from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2006)). This deficit, of 4 yen/m3, is usually
compensated with taxes. Thus, local governments should reduce their public expenditures by improving their revenue or
reducing these costs.
idents obtain the same utility at a migration equilibrium that is defined as a state where there
are no residents with incentives to migrate to other regions. Taking these factors into account,
we can show in this paper that whether residents’ utility is high or not at a migration equilibri-
um depends on the distribution of population. In a country with two regions, if a region where
a local government improves its public balance is congested, meaning that it is an overpopu-
lated region, the increase of residents’ utility will be weakened through a worsening of this
congestion. At the same time, if the other region is also congested, the utility will rise since
the emigration from the other region will mitigate its congestion. As a result, we find that the
improvement of the public budget balance will increase all residents’ utility when both regions
are congested. In this case, efforts to improve the public budget balance will be Pareto effi-
cient at the migration equilibrium. On the other hand, when the other region is sparse, the
improvement in the public budget balance in a congested region will cause residents to
migrate from the sparse region into the congested region. Since the sparseness and congestion
become worse in both regions, residents’ utility decreases as a result of this improvement. In
this case, the local government in the congested region does not make Pareto efficient efforts
at a migration equilibrium. However, the local government in the sparse region always makes
Pareto efficient efforts, since immigration mitigates the sparseness. In summary, it is shown
that whether local governments make Pareto efficient efforts depends on the population condi-
tions in other regions. Since local governments do not have any authority to improve the pub-
lic balance in the other region, they will raise their own residents’ utility by influencing migra-
tion by controlling their own public expenditures. As a result, the utility of the residents in
their own region cannot be higher than that at the optimal population scale of the other region.
Thus, no local government has an incentive to improve the public balance if the residents’ util-
ity in the other region decreases due to emigration from the region. While previous researches
have not paid attention to the relation between the population distribution and the distortion of
efforts to improve the public budget balance, the relation is demonstrated in this paper.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model structure and
the main results. Section 3 describes the case in which local governments simultaneously
decide to provide local public goods and make efforts to reduce public expenditures. The con-
clusion is given in Section 4. The proofs of the propositions and lemma are provided in the
Appendix.
2 Model
A nation consists of two regions, named i = 1, 2, and a local government exists in each
region. The population in region i is ni , and the aggregate population is n–, thus n2 = n– – n1. We
assume continuous residents, so that the weight of each resident is zero. In other words, the
population is atom-less. Each resident has a homogeneous preference and is able to choose
either region 1 or 2 to reside in. The utility function of a representative resident in region i is 
ui (xi , yi). xi is the consumption of a private good and yi is the consumption of a local public
good which has no externalities to the other region and which is provided by the local govern-
ment in region i. We assume that ui is strictly quasi-concave, 6 and that yi is a normal good. 7
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xx) > 0. We assume this condition.
Each resident is endowed with one unit of homogeneous labor which is supplied to firms
in region i. Firms produce the private good and pay labor a wage equal to the marginal prod-
uct. The collective production function for the private good in region i is assumed to be fi(ni) 8
which is concave, f 'i ≥ 0, f"i ≤ 0 and fi (0) = 0. The firms in region i are assumed to be owned
by the residents of region i. Hence, the profits of the firms in region i are equally distributed
to each resident of region i. We also assume there are no transfers between regions. Each local
government collects a resident-based head tax in order to produce the public good. The mar-
ginal cost of the public good is ci which is fixed for yi. We consider that each local government
makes efforts to improve the public budget balance, which is public revenue minus public
expenditure. In this paper, improving this balance means that each local government decreases
its net public expenditure. Thus, the constraint of resources in region i is fi (ni) = ni xi + ci yi + F
– ai + d(ai). ai is efforts and d(ai) is the cost of efforts. One unit of effort leads to a reduction
of one unit of public expenditure, but the effort cost is generated. F is the fixed cost of the
local public good. We assume that F – ai + d(ai) > 0 for all ai , and that F = 0 when yi = 0. This
means that F is larger than the surplus of the cost reduction effort. 9 We assume that d(ai) is
strictly convex, d(0) = 0, d'(ai) > 0, d'(0) = 0, d'(+ ) = + , and d"(ai) > 0. In addition, we
describe ai satisfying ai – d(ai) = 0 as a–. We assume that local governments choose ai ∈[0, a–].
This assumption means that local governments do not make efforts that lead to deficits. We
assume that each local government chooses the effort level ai and the quantity of local public
good yi to maximize the utility of a representative resident in region i.
Pareto Efficiency Following Wellisch (1994), Pareto efficient allocation is defined as feasi-
ble allocations at which it is impossible to increase ui without reducing u j (i ≠ j, i, j = 1, 2).
However, we assume that neither government can compel residents to migrate from one region
to another region. 10 Residents migrate to get higher utility. Since each resident is atom-less, if
all residents in both region 1 and 2 have the same utility level, then they have no incentives to
migrate to the other region. Thus, Pareto efficiency should lead to ui = u j. In addition, Pareto
efficiency, which is defined as the impossibility of increasing ui without reducing u j under ui
= u j, is characterized by a linear combination of u1 and u2 being maximized subject to the fol-
lowing (2) and (3).
u1(x1, y1) + (1 – )u
2(x2, y2) (1)
s.t. f1(n1) + f2(n– – n1) – n1 x1 – (n– – n1)x2 – c1 y1 – F + a1 – d(a1) – c2 y2 – F + a2 – d(a2) = 0 (2)
u1 = u2 (3)
0 ≤ ≤ 1, x1, x2, y1, y2 ≥ 0
(2) is the constraint of resources.
We use the Lagrange function, and define 1 as the Lagrange multiplier of the resources
constraint (2) and define 2 as the multiplier of the migration equilibrium constraint (3). We
assume an interior solution to xi and yi.
max
x1 , x2 , y1 , y2 , n1 , a1 , a2
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8 We assume that productivity may be different between regions. Precisely, the product function depends on the land,
f (ni , Ti)≡fi(ni). Ti means the land scale in region i. The larger Ti , the larger the productivity.
9 If F is small, the effort surplus may be larger than the public cost in the region. More accurately, ci yi + F – ai +
d(ai) < 0 for some ai . In this case, the local government returns this surplus to residents. As a result, production of the pri-
vate good increases in the region. This case is not intrinsically different from the following analysis. In addition, it may not
be actually returned to private goods since the effort surplus is not always pecuniary revenue. In this paper, since it is not
our purpose to clarify this, we assume that F – ai + d(ai) > 0 for all ai .
10 We also assume that even if there is a social planner like the benevolent central government, this planner cannot do that.
We achieve the following first-order conditions:
xi : ( + 2)u
i
x – 1 ni = 0, (4)
yi : ( + 2)u
i
y – 1 ci = 0, (5)
n1 : f '1 (n1) – x1 = f '2 (n– – n1) – x2, (6)
ai : 1 (1 – d'(ai)) = 0,    i = 1, 2. (7)
From (4) and (5) , we obtain
( + 2) (ni – ci) = 0. (8)
2 is positive as long as u1 = u2 at the optimal solution. We assume that there exists an interior
solution of the migration equilibrium, 2 > 0. Thus, (8) means that Pareto efficiency for yi is
satisfied when the sum of the marginal rate of substitution for yi equals the marginal cost of
the local public good, which satisfies the Samuelson condition.
We denote the Pareto efficient ai as a*i. Then, a*i is satisfied by
1 – d'(a*i) = 0. (9)
since 1 = ( + 2)u
i
x /ni > 0 from (4) and 2 > 0. This means that the socially optimal effort of
each local government is to make the marginal effect of the improvement of the public budget
balance equal to the marginal cost of efforts.
From (6), a distribution of population becomes socially efficient when the net marginal
product in each region is equal. If (6) is not equal, more private goods can be produced in the
nation by having the residents migrate from the region with the smaller net marginal product
to the region with the larger one. We denote a Pareto efficient population in region i as n*i.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the incentive for improving the balance of public
revenues and expenditures. These incentives encourage efforts to reduce the costs and increase
the revenues of public services. We can consider the following methods for cutting costs and
increasing revenues: outsourcing and restructuring public services, reducing staff, introducing
a system for evaluating public policies to avoid waste, computerization of office work,
improving the revenue of or privatizing water, gas, traffic and childcare services, and so on. In
practice, it is difficult for local governments to introduce these methods in the short term
since they require the implementation of organizational and institutional changes. In addition,
these methods involve costs. Thus, once local governments introduce such methods, it is diffi-
cult to withdraw them quickly since they usually require long-term contracts and changes in
public institutions. For example, Ota city 11 made a contract for entrusting water service to a
private firm. 12 The contract term was from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2007. This contract
contained a clause imposing a penalty if either of the parties canceled the contract. That is to
say, Ota city was committed to this system of providing the water service in trust with the pri-
vate firm. 13 From this viewpoint, improving the public budget balance requires a commit-
ment. Thus, it is appropriate to set the behavior for improving the public balance on the first
stage of the game in our model.
Following Mitsui & Sato, we assume that residents can freely migrate to the region in
uiy
uix
uix
ni
Katsuya Kobayashi
67
11 Ota city is in Gunma prefecture, Japan.
12 Komiyama (2003) explains this entrusting contract in detail.
13 Another example is the outsourcing of simple routines. Shizuoka prefecture in Japan established a center for gener-
al-affairs office work (Somu-jimu center) and introduced the outsourcing of general-affairs office work (somu-jimu) in
2002. Shizuoka prefecture has saved about 97 million yen every year. Wakasugi & Kobayashi (2006) explains this.
which they want to live, and that they cannot move between regions after they choose a region.
This assumption is based on the following fact. Residents really always choose their occupa-
tions when they decide where to live. It is not easy for individuals to change jobs because of
the time required to search for a new job. On the other hand, providing many local public
goods is a daily task. For example, it includes police, fire fighting, library, health care ser-
vices, and so on. From those features, the time structure in this model is based on the follow-
ing three stages. First, local governments set their own effort level, ai , which is how they will
improve their public budget balance, ex-ante. Second, residents decide where to reside. Third,
local governments provide local public goods, yi . We will solve the game by backward induc-
tion, so that we will use a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the following sections.
In Section3, we will consider not only the case where local governments take resident
migration into account, but also where they do not take it into account.
Sub-game perfect equilibrium We will find a sub-game perfect equilibrium in this model.
The model will be solved using backward induction.
Stage 3 At stage 3, local governments set yi given ni and ai in order to maximize a represen-
tative resident in its own region. Specifically, our maximization problem is
ui (xi, yi) (10)
s.t. fi (ni) = ni xi + ci yi + F – ai + d(ai).
Then, the first order condition is
(ni – ci) = 0. (11)
Therefore, yi satisfies the Samuelson condition, namely that yi is Pareto efficient. 14 yi is set
given ni and ai , so that yi is a function of them. If ni and ai are not Pareto efficient, the quanti-
ty of yi will not be equal to yi of (8).
We denote the indirect utility of the resident in region i as
Vi (ni , ai) ≡ (13)
From the fixed cost F > 0, the resources constraint in (10) may be in a breach in the neighbor-
hood of ni = 0. In this case, we assume xi = yi = 0 and Vi = 0.
Stage 2 At stage 2, residents choose either region 1 or 2 depending on which gives them a
larger utility. If Vi (ni , ai) > Vj (nj, aj) for given ai and aj , residents in region j emigrate from j to i.
If the utilities in region 1 and 2 are equal, residents do not migrate. Since the migration equilibri-
um is defined as a state where each resident has no incentive for moving to the other region given
others’ choices, this is defined as the following migration equilibrium conditions, either 1 or 2.
if  fi – ni xi – ci yi – F + ai – d ≥ 0
if  fi – ni xi – ci yi – F + ai – d < 0.
, yifi – ci yi – F + ai – dni
0
ui
uiy
uix
uix
ni
max
yi
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14 As the population in i increases under  f 'i – xi ≥ 0, yi becomes larger because yi is a normal good.
Specifically, we obtain
= > 0 (12)
by differentiating (8) or (11) from the quasi-concavity of ui and the normal good of yi . However, dyi /dni may be negative
when  f 'i – xi < 0 This property affects the second order condition for ni of the indirect utility function.
1/uix ( f 'i – xi) (uix uxy – uiy uixx) + uiy
1/(uix uiy) (2uix uiy uixy – (uix)2uiyy – (uiy)2uixx
dyi
dni
1. If n1 , n2 > 0, then V1(n1 , a1) = V2 (n2 , a2).
2. If ni = 0, then Vi (0, ai) ≤ Vj (n–, aj).
Statement 1 of the condition means that the migration equilibrium is an interior solution.
Statement 2 of condition means that it is a corner solution. These conditions constitute a Nash
equilibrium at stage 2. Since the weight of each resident is zero (atom-less), even if a resident
who chooses region 1 migrates to region 2, he (she) cannot have an influence on the others
and on the productivity in each region. Therefore, under these migration equilibrium condi-
tions, each resident lacks any incentive for migration given the others’ strategies. As a result,
satisfying these conditions means a Nash equilibrium at this stage.
The migration equilibrium depends on the level of efforts, (a1, a2), which is determined at
stage 1, so that the migration equilibrium becomes a function of (a1, a2). However, there may
be multiple migration equilibria at (a1, a2). 15 In this case, each equilibrium is not always con-
tinuous at each value of (a1, a2). This discontinuity complicates the analysis in this paper. In
order to prevent this complexity from centering the discussion, we denote one migration equi-
librium as n1(a1, a2), as the case in which the migration equilibrium varies continuously with
the change of (a1 , a2), meaning that the residents’ strategy is n1(a1 , a2). 16 We consider the
migration equilibrium in this limited class. In addition, the migration equilibrium n1(a1 , a2)
may disappear at some (a1, a2). This fact depends on the configuration of V1 and V2. In this
case, the migration equilibrium becomes another equilibrium with the change of (a1, a2).
We obtain the effect of a unit resident migrating from the region j to i by differentiating (13): 17
= [ f '
i
(n
i
) – x
i
] (14)
= [ f '
j
(n– – n
i
) – x
j
]
by using the envelope theorem on (11). Whether a flow of population into region i increases
their utility or not depends on the sign of [ · ] in the above. Vi may have multiple peaks for ni
generally as Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980) suggested in their discussion about resident migration
in Ch. 17. 18 We define the following condition.
Definition 1 ∀ni∈(–ni , n
–
i) for some –ni and n
–
i in [0, n–],
1. if f 'i (ni) – xi > 0, then region i is locally sparse,
2. if f 'i (ni) – xi = 0,  f 'i (ni – ) – xi > 0 and f 'i (ni + ) – xi < 0 for all > 0 such that (ni –
, ni + ) ⊆(–ni , n
–
i), then region i is locally optimal, and
3. if f 'i (ni) – xi < 0, then region i is locally congested.
Statement 1 of the definition means that a flow of population into region i will bring increas-
u jx
n– – ni
uix
ni
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15 In this case, the migration equilibria will be not a function but a correspondence of (a1, a2).
16 Mayers, Wellisch and Caplan et al. research models that assumed that each local government takes resident migra-
tion into account in the framework of the game. However, these studies do not consider the possibility of multiple migra-
tion equilibria and of the discontinuity of a migration equilibrium, so that they deal with the migration equilibrium as a
function of some variables. This paper follows them.
17 A unit resident does not mean one resident but one weight resident.
ing utility to the region from (14). Thus, the population in i is still sparse. Statements 2 and 3
are parallel logic. However, as we stated above, Vi may have multiple peaks for ni , so that this
definition is only local. If Vi has a single peak for ni , this definition is global.
Next, we will consider the stability condition of a migration equilibrium. If a migration
equilibrium is disturbed for some reason, it may diverge, for example to ni = 0 or ni = n–. To
avoid this divergence, we look only at the case of a locally stable migration equilibrium. This
stability means that when some residents with small positive weight migrate from region 1 to
region 2 at a migration equilibrium, the utility of residents in region 2 becomes higher than that
in region 1, and vice versa. As a result, the residents who migrated return. Hence, we define
Vi / ni – Vj / ni < 0. 19 The stability condition is used in Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980), Boadway
& Flatters, Wellisch, Caplan et al. and Mitsui & Sato. 20 In this model, the stability condition is
D≡ ( f '1(n1) – x1) + ( f '2(n– – n1) – x2) < 0. (15)
A migration equilibrium under this stability condition is categorized into one of only the
following three cases. Specifically,
Case 1  f 'i – xi < 0 and  f 'j – xi < 0,
Case 2  f 'i – xi = 0 and  f 'j – xi < 0, and
Case 3  f 'i – xi < 0,  f 'j – xi > 0, and | ( f 'i – xi)| > | ( f 'j – xj)|, i ≠ j,  i, j = 1, 2.
In addition to this stability condition, we assume that V1 and V2 do not become tangent or over-
lap each other at any of the migration equilibria.
Stage 1 At stage 1, each local government chooses an effort level. First, we consider how
residents migrate when a local government increases its effort level. In other words, how does
the migration equilibrium vary when a local government slightly improves the public budget
balance. To see this, we differentiate V1 (n1, a1) = V2 (n– – n1, a2) by ai. When the migration
equilibrium n1(a1, a2) is continuous about ai , we obtain
= – (1 – d' (ai)) (16)
from (15). This means that increasing efforts to improve the public budget balance brings
immigration when the effort is less than the Pareto efficient level, 1 – d' (ai) > 0. However, if a
local government makes a major change in its effort, then the migration equilibrium may
become discontinuous or move to the corner solutions, ni = n– or 0.
Now, if residents do not migrate when government i increases its effort, the change of the
utility will be
= (1 – d' (ai)). (17)
uix
nini is fixed.
uix
ni
1
D
u jx
nj
uix
ni
u2x
n– – n1
u1x
n1
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18 The second order condition of Vi for ni is
= + – + +
The first bracketed expression on the right-hand side is negative if  f 'i – xi > 0. But the second bracketed expression is posi-
tive since y'i (ni) > 0 when  f 'i – xi > 0. Thus, we cannot identify the sign of the second order condition even if  f 'i – xi > 0. Of
course, we cannot identify it in the case of  f 'i – xi < 0, either.
19 Boadway & Flatters points out that both regions tend to have a unique stable migration equilibrium under a condi-
tion of overall overpopulation and that both tend to have an unstable migration equilibrium if there is under-population.
20 Mitsui & Sato defines it more generally without using differential calculus.
y'i (ni)
(uiy)
2
uix ci
(uix u
i
xy – u
i
y u
i
xx)
V'i (ni)
(uix)
2
V' (ni)
ni
uix f"i
ni
uixx ( f 'i – xi)
ni
V'i (ni)
ux
This means that Vi is an increasing function of ai till a*i and is a decreasing function of ai
beyond a*i when ni is fixed. In other words, the indirect utility is maximized at the Pareto effi-
cient effort a*i at each ni , that is to say Vi (ni , ai) ≤ Vi (ni , a*i) for all ni and ai.
Next, we consider each local government’s decision regarding its own efforts, a1 and a2.
We differentiate Vi by ai and substitute (16) into it. We obtain
= ( f 'i (ni) – xi) + (1 – d' (ai)) = ( f 'j (nj) – xj)(1 – d' (ai)) (18)
If Vi / ai > 0, then the local government i will get a larger payoff by slightly increasing its
effort as long as the migration equilibrium varies continuously. If Vi / ai < 0, then local gov-
ernment i will get a larger payoff by slightly decreasing its effort as well. We obtain the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1 If the strategies chosen by residents become a migration equilibrium n1(a1, a2)
which is a differentiable function such that f '1 – x1 < 0 and f '2 – x2 < 0 for all a1 and a2, then (a*1,
a*2) becomes each local government’s behavior in the strategy of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In the case of this proposition, two regions are congested at any (a1, a2). We can interpret this
feature as the case where the effect of each local government’s effort is relatively small and
total population is relatively large since local governments have hardly any influence on the
congested population. Then, (a1, a2) becomes Pareto efficient, but the population distribution
may not be so since (6) does not always follow from (18). Therefore, an effort to improve the
public budget balance does not have the effect of making the population distribution efficient.
Of course, since Proposition 1 is a sufficient condition for the efficiency effort, the other con-
ditions may hold, too.
Here, we assume that Vi has a single peak for ni. 21 This assumption is plausible in prac-
tice. Hayashi (2002) measures a minimal efficient scale of population in Japanese local gov-
ernments. According to Hayashi’s analysis, each local government in Japan has a U-form with
regard to the local public expenditure per capita, since the fixed costs and the congestion
effects of the local public good, which are different in each region, bring a scale economy to
each local government. This means that there exists a different intrinsic optimal population
level for each local government, while Hayashi’s analysis only shows optimal scales of the
public expenditures per capita. Thus, it is thought that this assumption is plausible. We denote
the optimal population level in region i as ni** when Vi has a single peak.
Assumption 1 The following conditions about Vi (ni , ai) for all ai are assumed.
1. There exists a unique ni**∈ (0, n–) that satisfies = [ f 'i (ni**) – xi] = 0
2. ∀ni∈ [0, ni**), > 0, and∀ni∈ (ni**, n–), < 0. 22
Using this assumption, we obtain the following facts about each optimal population (ni**, nj**):
ni** < ni (a1, a2) and nj** < n– – ni (a1, a2) in Case 1, ni** = ni (a1, a2) and nj** < n– – ni (a1, a2) in Case 2,
uix
ni**ni = ni**
u1x u2x
Dn1(n– – n1)
uix
ni
uix
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21 The second order condition of Vi for ni is not always negative even if ui is strictly quasi-concave. Boadway &
Flatters assumes that the graph of Vi for ni is single peaked.
22 We can consider the example case of a single peak. See Appendix.
and ni** < ni (a1, a2) and nj** > n– – ni (a1, a2) in Case 3. See Figure. With regard to the three cases
under Assumption 1, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, there are no stable and interior multiple migration equilib-
ria satisfying the combinations of Case 1 - Case 1, Case 1 - Case 2 and Case 2 - Case2.
However, multiple migration equilibria satisfying Case 3 and another case may exist. As a
result, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, local governments i and j choose the following effort
level in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
1. If the migration equilibrium n1 (a1, a2) satisfies f '1 – x1 < 0 and f '2 – x2 < 0 at (a*1, a*2),
then (a*1, a*2) is a Nash equilibrium at stage 1.
2. If the migration equilibrium n1 (a1, a2) satisfies f 'i – xi = 0,  f 'j – xj < 0 and Vj (n–, a*j) ≤
Vj (n– – ni , aj) at (a*i , aj), then (a*i , aj) is a Nash equilibrium at stage 1.
3. If the migration equilibrium n1 (a1, a2) satisfies f 'i – xi < 0,  f 'j – xj > 0, | ( f 'i – xi)| > |
( f 'j – xj)| and is continuous for all (a1, a2), then (0, a*j) and (a–, a*j) is a Nash equilibrium
at stage 1.
aj may not become a*j , and ni = n1 (a1, a2) if i = 1 and ni = n– – n1 (a1, a2) if i = 2.
Statements 1 and 2 in Proposition 2 state that (a*i , a*j) and (a*i , aj) are the behaviors in SPE if
the migration equilibrium is either Case 1 or Case 2 at (a*i , a*j) and (a*i , aj), respectively. On the
other hand, statement 3 means that the severer condition, meaning the existence of Case 3 for
all (ai , aj), is required in order for it to be a strategy of SPE.
In statement 1, the migration equilibrium which satisfies  f 'i – xi < 0 and  f 'j – xj < 0 at (a*1,
a*2) is interpreted as the case where the total population is large and where each region’s poten-
tial gap is similar. The large total population in this paper means that n1** + n2** < n– at (a*1, a*2),
that is to say that each region cannot absorb the total population at the optimal population
level. The potential gap means the difference of resident’s utility at the optimal population
level and at (a*1, a*2) in each region. In other words, each local government has similar technol-
ogy and know-how to provide the public good, and the productivity of the private good is sim-
ilar in each region. In this case, when the total population is large, both local governments
choose the Pareto efficient effort level. The logic is the following. When local government i
increases its effort to improve its public budget balance, then the residents’ utility will
increase in i. As a result, residents will migrate from region j to i. Since both regions are con-
gested, this migration will dilute the increase of utility. However, the congestion in region j
will be mitigated, and the utility of residents in j will be improved. As a result, at the new
migration equilibrium, the utility of residents in both regions will increase. If local govern-
ment i decreases its effort, the opposite will occur. Hence, the condition where both regions
are congested encourages efforts by each local government to make efforts at efficiency.
In statement 2, the migration equilibrium which satisfies  f 'i – xi = 0 and  f 'j – xj < 0 at (a*i ,
aj) is interpreted as the case where the potential gap is large and where the total population is
large. In this case, the residents’ utility at the optimal population level in region j is larger than
it is in region i, when both local governments choose an efficient effort. Local government j,
which has large potential, does not make efforts in spite of having room to improve its public
u jx
nj
uix
ni
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budget balance, while local government i chooses an efficient effort. The reason is the follow-
ing. If j increases its effort, residents in i will migrate from i to j. Then, j’s congestion will wors-
en and i will become sparse. On the other hand, if j decreases its effort, residents in j will emi-
grate from j to i. And then, although j’s congestion will be mitigated, i will become congested
and this congestion will bring a larger deterioration than the mitigation. As a result, residents’
utility will decrease. The condition Vj (n–, a*j) ≤ Vj (n– – ni , aj) at (a*i , aj) means the utility level
when the number of residents migrating to j at Pareto efficient effort is not very large. This
case is where the total population is large and the effort effect is small. If Vj (n–, a*j) is large, on
the contrary, local government j may choose a Pareto efficient effort level and attract all resi-
dents. In statements 1 and 2, the total population is large since n1** + n2** < n–. Specifically, when
the total population is large, the equilibrium tends to appear at either Case 1 or 2.
In statement 3, the total population level is small since ni > ni** and n– – ni < nj**. In addition,
if there is neither a stable nor unstable migration equilibrium, except for the corner equilibri-
um, the potential gap between regions is large since residents’ utility at the optimal population
level is region j is larger than it is in region i. In this case, local government i chooses either
no effort or excessive effort, while local government j chooses the efficient effort. If i makes
the efficient effort, residents will migrate from region j to region i. This migration will cause a
worsening of the congestion for i and sparseness for j. This will invite a decline in the utility.
Hence, j chooses the smallest or largest effort level at the equilibrium.
In conclusion, it is better for the total population to be large and for the difference of the
potentiality in each region to be small in order to elicit Pareto efficiency from each local gov-
ernment. Incidentally, the population distribution at the equilibrium may not become Pareto
efficient. The efficient population distribution is such that the net marginal product is equal-
ized. (18) does not guarantee this efficiency.
3 The case with simultaneous decisions
In the previous section, we examined the behavior when neither local government could
change at stage 2 or 3. However, we can also consider the case where yi and ai are decided
simultaneously. This case is divided into the following two cases.
The case where migration is not taken into account First, we consider the case in which
neither local government takes migration into account. In this case, each local government
maximizes
ui (xi, yi)
s.t. fi (ni) = ni xi + ci yi + F – ai + d(ai)
given ni. The first order conditions are
yi :   [ni – ci] = 0 (19)
ai :   (1 – d' (ai)) = 0. (20)
The Samuelson condition and Pareto efficient effort level are fulfilled in (19) and (20) given
ni . However, we do not know how the population is distributed since neither local government
uix
ni
uiy
uix
uix
ni
max
ai , yi
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considers the residents’ migration at all in this case. In other words, Pareto efficiency of the
population distribution is not at all guaranteed by (19) and (20). In addition, residents’ utility
in this case is not larger than that in the previous section. At first sight, it seems that the utility
in the case where migration is not taken account of is larger than that in the case where it is
taken account of since the effort is always Pareto efficient in the former case. However, when
Vi is either statement 2 or 3 in Proposition 2, there exists some ai ≠ a*i which makes Vi larger.
This result applies in this case. Hence, the decision taking no account of migration is no more
efficient than that taking account of migration at least under the single peak assumption.
The case where migration is taken into account Second, we consider the case where each
local government takes migration into account. Then, each local government maximizes
ui (xi, yi)
s.t. fi (ni) = ni xi + ci yi + F – ai + d(ai)
taking account of the migration equilibrium n1(a1 , a2 , y1 , y2) which is a function of a1 , a2 , y1
and y2 . 23 In the case where the resident migration is taken into account, we do not know
whether this maximized problem fulfills the second order condition or not. Thus, we consider
the following. We differentiate ui for yi and ai. Then,
yi :   ( f 'i (ni) – xi) – ci + u
i
y , (21)
ai :   ( f 'i (ni) – xi) + (1 – d' (ai)). (22)
When yi changes slightly under u1 = u2 , the change of the migration equilibrium n1(a1 , a2 , y1 , y2)
will be
= – (ni – ci). (23)
If there are fewer local public goods than the amount under Samuelson’s rule, increasing yi
will bring immigration. We substitute (23) and (14) into (21) and (22), respectively. Then
these equations are
yi :   ( f 'j – xj) (ni – ci), (24)
ai :   ( f 'j – xj) (1 – d' (ai)). (25)
(25) is as the same as (18). This means that Proposition 1 applies to this case about the effort
level and local public good, 24 namely if n1(a1 , a2 , y1 , y2) satisfies  f '1 – x1 < 0 and  f '2 – x2 < 0 for
all a1 , a2 , y1 , y2 , then yi and ai will be Pareto efficient. In the other cases where n1 (a1 , a2 , y1 , y2)
does not satisfy both  f '1 – x1 < 0 and  f '2 – x2 < 0, the effort and public goods may not be Pareto
efficient.
u1x u2x
Dn1(n– – n1)
uiy
uix
u1x u2x
Dn1(n– – n1)
uiy
uix
uix
ni
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23 If i = 1, then ni = n1 (a1 , a2 , y1 , y2) and if i = 2, then ni = n
– – n1 (a1 , a2 , y1 , y2). In this case, residents will migrate
after they see (a1 , a2 , y1 , y2), so that the migration equilibrium becomes a function of these variables.
24 f 'i – xi is different from the previous section, since each local government maximizes for ai and yi given the other
government’s strategy. Then, the second order condition of ui about ni given ai and yi is
The population distribution does not always become Pareto efficient, that is (6). If the
population distribution is Pareto efficient and stable, then ai and yi will become Pareto effi-
cient, too, since  f '1 – x1 =  f '2 – x2 < 0. On the other hand, if local governments do not take
migration into account when they provide the local public goods, the Samuelson condition
will be satisfied at the migration equilibrium. At first sight, it seems more efficient for neither
local government to take resident migration into account. However, the residents in the case
where migration is taken into account may be better off than in the case where it is not taken
into account, since the population distribution may be more inefficient and each local govern-
ment will not adjust it in the former case.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the incentives for local governments to improve their public balance
under resident migration. The paper showed that in a country with two regions, whether a
local government makes efforts or not depends on the population condition in the other
region. Even if a local government intends to improve its public budget balance in order to
improve the residents’ utility in its own region, the utility will become identical to that of resi-
dents in the other region, since residents will migrate until their utility becomes equal. Then, if
the outflow of population from one (congested) region improves the residents’ utility, the local
government in the other region will make efficient efforts. However, if the utility worsens due
to the outflow of population from one (sparse) region, the local government in the other region
will not make efforts. This local government then has the incentive to worsen its public bal-
ance in order to promote migration into its own region. Thus, local governments do not always
make efforts efficiently under decentralization. In addition, the population distribution is not
guaranteed to be Pareto efficient. However, if migration is taken into account in making this
decision, it has the effect of making the population distribution efficient to a certain degree.
Of course, if migration is not taken into account, this effect does not exist. Thus, even if there
is no device such as an interregional transfer mechanism under the decentralized local public
finance system, the effort of improving the public balance with migration taken into account
has the effect of making the population distribution efficient to a certain degree.
Appendix
The example of a single peak population In this section, we consider the example of a single
population peak. We consider the case where ui (xi , yi) = xi yi , f i (ni) = n
α
i (0 <α< 1/2), d (ai) =
a2i , and n– = 1. Then, the constraint of resources in region i becomes n
α
i = ni xi + ci yi + F – ai + a
2
i .
We calculate (11) in this example, and get
xi = and yi = .
nαi + ai – a
2
i – F
2ci
nαi + ai – a
2
i – F
2ni
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= + .
If  f 'i – xi ≥ 0, then 2ui/ n2i < 0. However, when  f 'i – xi < 0, this condition may become positive. Hence, the indirect utility
may not fulfill the second order condition.
f"i
uix
ni
(uixx( f 'i – xi) – 2u
i
x )
f 'i – xi
n2i
Of course, if nαi + ai – a
2
i – F < 0, then xi = yi = 0. Thus, the indirect utility function becomes
Vi = (26)
When ni is small, n
α
i + ai – a
2
i – F < 0 in (26) because of the assumption of a large F. In this
case, the utility becomes zero. 25
Next, we prove that there is a case of a single peak for the population in this example. We
differentiate Vi by ni , and obtain
= .
For instance, when the parameters areα= 1/3 and F = 4/15, Vi has only one peak at ni** = 27(a2i
– ai)
3 + 64/125. The net benefit of the local government’s effort is 0 ≤ ai – a2i ≤ 1/4, so that the
range of the population of the peak is 721/8000 ≤ ni** ≤ 64/125].
Proof of Proposition 1 On (18), ai which maximizes Vi satisfies 1 – d' (a*i ) = 0 since f '1 – x1 <
0 and f '2 – x2 < 0  for any a1 and a2 and D < 0. aj does also. Hence, (a*1, a*2) is the strategy in a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1    Supposing that there are two or more migration equilibria at (ai , aj)
such that ai = aj , these satisfy one of three cases. We denote two of these migration equilibria
as (ni , V1 = V2) and (ñi, V˜1 = V˜2), respectively. 26
1. We suppose that one migration equilibrium ni is Case 1 and that the other migration
equilibrium ñi is also Case 1. From Assumption 1, if ñi > ni , V˜i < V1 = V2 < V˜j and if ñi < ni , V˜i
> V1 = V2 > V˜j. However, these contradict V˜1 = V˜2 which is an interior condition.
2. We suppose that one migration equilibrium ni is Case 1 and the other migration equi-
librium ñi is Case 2. Then, ñi = n*i < ni under Assumption 1 because of f 'i – xi < 0 at ni and f 'i –
xi = 0 at ñi. Therefore, V˜i > V1 = V2. In addition, V˜j < V1 = V2 since n– – n*i > n– – ni . However,
these contradict V˜1 = V˜2.
3. We suppose that one migration equilibrium ni is Case 2 and the other migration equi-
librium ñi is also Case 2. Then, ni = n*i = ñi since f 'i – xi = 0. From Assumption 1, there is only
one n*i . Therefore, there are no multiple equilibria, and only Case 2 is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof consists of three parts, 1, 2 and 3.
1. Let us assume that the local government i deviates from a*i to ai ≠ a*i given a*j . We
denote the migration equilibrium as ndi 27 at this deviation (ai , a
*
j).
1) First, we consider the case of a stable and interior migration equilibrium that varies
continuously from a*i to ai. (18) is 0 at a
*
i since 1 – d' (a
*
i) = 0. For all ai > a
*
i , Vi is a decreasing
function under Assumption 1 since residents migrate from i to j if (16) < 0 and f 'j – xj < 0 for
all ai > a
*
i. For all ai < a
*
i , Vi is an increasing function because of the same logic. Then, Vi is
(nαi + ai – a
2
i – F)[(2α–1) nαi – ai + a2i + F]
4n2i ci
if ni ≥ (F + a2i – ai) 1/α
if ni < (F + a
2
i – ai) 
1/α
nαi + ai – a
2
i – F
4ni ci
0
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25 See footnote 9.
26 If i = 1, then ni = n1 (a1, a2), and if i = 2, then ni = n
– – n1 (a1, a2).
27 ndi means that n
d
i = n
d
1 (a1, a2) if i = 1 and n
d
i = n
– – nd1 (a1, a2) if i = 2. n
d
1 (a1, a2) is the migration equilibrium when a
local government deviates.
maximized at a*i.
2) Next, we consider the case where the migration equilibrium does not vary continuously
from a*i to ai. This deviation brings the migration equilibria to either ni = 0, ni = n– or Case 3
because of Lemma 1. Then, at ni = 0 and ni = n– , Vi (0, ai) ≤ Vi (0, a*i) < Vi (ni , a*i) and Vi (n– , ai) <
Vi (n– , a
*
i) < Vi (ni , a
*
i) because of (17) and Assumption 1. Thus, this deviation decreases i’s payoff.
In Case 3, region i becomes either f 'i – xi < 0 or f 'i – xi > 0 at n
d
i. When f 'i – xi < 0 at n
d
i ,  f 'j
– xj > 0 in region j. Then ni < n
d
i because of Assumption 1 and f 'j – xj < 0 at ni. Thus, Vi (n
d
i , ai)
< Vi (n
d
i , a
*
i) < Vi (ni , a
*
i) since f 'i – xi < 0 in [ni , n
d
i ]. Hence, local government i does not have the
incentive for this deviation.
When f 'i – xi > 0 at n
d
i ,  f 'j – xj < 0 in region j. Then, n
d
i < ni since if n
d
i ≥ ni , Vi (ni , a*i) = 
Vj (n– – ni , a
*
j) ≤ Vj (n– – ndi , a*j) = Vi (ndi , ai) < Vi (ndi , a*i) from f 'j – xj < 0 and (17). But this contra-
dicts f 'i – xi < 0 in [ni , n
d
i ] at a
*
i under Assumption 1. Therefore, n
d
i < ni . Then, Vi (n
d
i , ai) = 
Vj (n– – n
d
i , a
*
j) < Vj (n– – ni , a
*
j) = Vi (ni , a
*
i) since f 'j – xj < 0 in [n
d
i , ni] and because of Assumption
1. Hence, local government i does not have the incentive for this deviation.
2. 1) Let us assume local government i deviates from a*i to ai ≠ a*i given aj. We denote the
migration equilibrium of this deviation as ndi. When the migration equilibrium varies continu-
ously from a*i to ai given aj , Vi is maximized at a
*
i , as is 1-1) in this proof.
We consider the case where the migration equilibrium does not vary continuously from a*i
to ai. This deviation brings the migration equilibria to either ni = 0, ni = n– or Case 3 because
of Lemma 1. Then, at ni = 0 and ni = n– , Vi (0, ai) ≤ Vi (0, a*i) < Vi (ni , a*i) and Vi (n– , ai) < Vi (n– , a*i)
< Vi (ni , a
*
i) because of (17) and Assumption 1. Thus, this deviation decreases i’s payoff.
In Case 3, region i becomes either f 'i – xi < 0 or f 'i – xi > 0 at n
d
i. When f 'i – xi < 0 at n
d
i ,  f 'j
– xj > 0 in region j. Then, ni < n
d
i because of Assumption 1 and f 'j – xj < 0 at ni. Then, Vi (n
d
i , ai)
< Vi (n
d
i , a
*
i) < Vi (ni , a
*
i) since f 'i – xi < 0 in (ni , n
d
i ] at a
*
i. Hence, local government i does not
have the incentive for this deviation.
When f 'i – xi > 0 at n
d
i ,  f 'j – xj < 0 in region j. Then, n
d
i < ni since if n
d
i ≥ ni , Vi (ni , a*i) = 
Vj (n– – ni , aj) ≤ Vj (n– – ndi , aj) = Vi (ndi , ai) < Vi (ndi , a*i) from f 'j – xj < 0 and (17). But this contra-
dicts f 'i – xi at ni at a
*
i under Assumption 1. Therefore, n
d
i < ni. Then Vi (n
d
i , ai) = Vj (n– – n
d
i , aj) <
Vj (n– – ni , aj) = Vi (ni , a
*
i) since f 'j – xj < 0 in [n
d
i , ni] and because of Assumption 1. Hence, 
Vi (n
d
i , ai) < Vi (ni , a
*
i), namely local government i does not have the incentive for this deviation.
2) Let us assume that local government j deviates from aj to aˆj ≠ aj given a*i. First, we con-
sider that the migration equilibrium moves to the other interior equilibrium from aj to aˆj. The
migration that causes this deviation decreases the utility of residents in region j since Vi is the
optimal scale of population at ni . Thus, j does not have the incentive for this deviation.
Second, we consider the case where the migration equilibrium moves to the corner due to the
change from aj to aˆj. In this case the migration equilibrium becomes either ni = 0 or ni = n–.
Then, Vj (0, a
*
j) ≤ Vi (n– , a*i) < Vi (ni , a*i) = Vj (n– – ni , aj) because of the definition of the migra-
tion equilibrium and f 'i – xi = 0 at ni , and Vj (n– , a
*
j) ≤ Vj (n– – ni aj), which is the condition in
this proposition. Hence, (a*i aj) is a Nash equilibrium.
3. 1) Vi is a decreasing function for ai in [0, a
*
i] since f 'j – xj > 0 and 1 – d' (ai) > 0 in (18).
Then, an optimal effort for j is ai = 0. On the other hand Vi is an increasing function for ai in
[a*i , a–] since f 'j – xj > 0 and 1 – d' (ai) < 0 in (18). Thus, ai which maximizes Vi is ai = 0, a–.
2) Vj is an increasing function for aj in [0, a
*
j] since f 'i – xi < 0 and 1 – d' (aj) > 0 in (18).
On the other hand, Vj is a decreasing function for aj in [a
*
j , a–] since f 'i – xi < 0 and 1 – d' (aj) <
0 in (18). Thus, aj which maximizes Vj is aj = a*j.
Q.E.D.
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